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Abstract
Nine Indonesian Constitutional Justices have the authority to annul a law 
drafted by 550 Parliament members and the President. The Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Indonesia (“the Court”), particularly in deciding cases 
of judicial review, has the capability to declare words, sentences, paragraphs, 
articles or the law unconstitutional. Consequently, it is essential for the Court 
to take into account legal arguments. The fundamental element of these legal 
arguments is constitutional interpretation, which serves as a parameter in 
determining constitutionality of the laws. However, in exercising its authority, 
the Court needs to interpret the Constitution as a basis for deciding a case. 
The standards for determining the constitutionality of a law must be the text of 
the Constitution, not what the judges would prefer the Constitution to mean. 
Constitutional supremacy necessarily assumes that a superior rule is what the 
Constitution says it is, not what the judges prefer it to be. [Craig R. Ducat: E3]. 
The Court period 2003–2008 were the Court’s the formative years, and as such 
are important to understand the methodology and interpretative approaches 
adopted by the Court. Many observers of the Court’s early decisions are still 
unsure of the overarching approach and methodology adopted by the Court. Thus, 
there is a need for a close analysis and criticism of the Court’s early decisions 
to determine which methods and approaches it has adopted and whether these 
are appropriate in the Indonesian context. The Court has openly referred to the 
experiences of foreign jurisdiction in constitutional law, and therefore it would 
be appropriate to analyze the court’s decisions in a broader comparative context 
of constitutional interpretative approaches from around the world.
Key words: Constitutional Interpretation, Judicial Review, Constitutional Court, 
Constitution
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I. INTRODUCTION
The idea for this paper arose during my engagement with the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court. I worked for Constitutional Court of Indonesia from 
April 2004 to April 2009 as an Associate to Justice Maruarar Siahaan. I recall 
that in the early months of working at the Court, no one really knew where 
the Constitutional Court building was located. I had to direct my taxi driver 
to reach the Court. When I left the Court in 2009, the ͢͝Ǧƪoor gothic building 
remained standing Ƥrm close to the Presidential State Palace in central Jakarta. 
During my time working at the Court, I was required to attend court hearings, 
provide legal opinions and do research for the Justices. Somehow, during that 
time, I could sense the importance of the cases faced by the Court. At times, 
the government and parliament objected to the Court as a newly established 
institution and to the role of the Court to protect the fulƤlment of the ͝945 
Indonesian Constitution. There were moments when the Court had to temper 
and slow down their activism to avoid negative reaction from the Government 
and Parliament to the Court’s performance. 
This paper explains the approach  to constitutional interpretation exercised 
by the Court  in interpreting the Indonesian Constitution against the cases 
brought before it. It should be kept in mind that the tradition of judicial review 
did not exist before the establishment of the Court. Thus, the Court needed to 
learn how to interpret the Constitution with the resources available and a lack 
of existing constitutional law precedent. The Court is not a political machine, 
but through its decisions, it has shaped the democratization and democratic 
process in Indonesia, acted as a protector of human rights and enhanced the 
rule of law in Indonesia. 
It is worth noting that this paper limits its scope to the Ƥrst bench of the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court in the period from 2003 to 2008 only. Upon 
the end of the Ƥrst bench period, Chief Justice Mahfud MD brought substantive 
justice and a responsive approach to the Court. This approach was continued 
by subsequent Chief Justices Akil Mochtar, Hamdan Zoelva and Arief Hidayat. 
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Examining the entire court approach in constitutional interpretation is not 
feasible for the scope of this paper. 
This paper is based on four themes. The Ƥrst is the idea to create a 
constitutional court in Indonesia, second, the tenure and proƤle of the Ƥrst 
Constitutional Court justices, third, defining constitutional interpretation 
methodology in Indonesia, and fourth analysis of cases heard by the Constitutional 
Court in the given period. Finally, observations are given as to the progressiveness 
of the Court’s decisions. 
II. DISCUSSION
Constitutional Court and Constitutional Interpretation
Constitutional Interpretation
Jeơrey Goldsworthy argued that written constitutions are not selfǦactualizing._ 
If they are to be maintained over time, they require interpretation and adaption 
to changing circumstances. The Constitutional Court is responsible for analysing 
and developing reliable approaches to interpretation that successfully keep faith 
with the principles and underlying values of the constitutional text._ The standards 
for assessing the constitutionality of a law must be the text of the Constitution, 
not what the judges would prefer the Constitution to mean._
This controversy centered around a set of questions as to what the constitution 
‘means’ and how it should be interpreted. Is the meaning of a particular text 
equivalent to a statement of its author’s belief and intention, or does the meaning 
of this text change over time and vary with the changing perspective and interest 
of its interpreter? Central to any theory of constitutional interpretation is an 
understanding of the role of a court in a democracy, and if judicial review is 
authorized, what role, if any, does judicial deference to political actors play? 
What weight should be accorded the constitutional views of legislative majorities? 
How majoritarian should interpretive theory be; should judicial understandings 
be open to normative inƪuence from social movement as reƪected either in 
legislation or in changing public opinion, or should interpretive theory emphasize 
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more the role of independent judicial judgment on legal values in securing the 
constitutional bases for a democratic government, under law, to function?_
Constitutional interpretation is an extraordinarily difficult enterprise, 
which requires striking an appropriate balance between competing, weighty 
considerations. The distinction between legitimate and illegitimate changes 
depends on a number of other diƥcult distinctions, such as between determinacy 
and indeterminacy, purpose used to clarify meaning and purpose used to change 
it, genuine implications and spurious ones, evidence of intention or understanding 
that illuminates original meaning and that which does not, changes in the 
application of a provision and changes in its meaning, and so on._
Modern legal scholars recognize six main methods of constitutional 
interpretation namely textual, historical, functional, doctrinal, prudential, 
equitable, and natural interpretation._ Prof. Jimly Asshiddiqie, the Ƥrst Chief 
Justice of the Constitutional Court stated the options to interpret constitution 
namely textual, grammatical, history, sociology, sociologies, philosophy, teleology, 
holistic, thematic._
icki Jackson oơers a simpliƤed three category approach for constitutional 
interpretation , namely (1) historical interpretation by reference to past decisions 
(by relevant public decision makers) embodied in positive law, whether written 
or unwritten, (2) purposive interpretation by reasoning about constitutional 
purposes, (3) multi-valences approaches that draw on original understanding, 
purposes, structure, history, values, and consequences to arrive at constitutional 
judgment._ Multi-valence interpretative theories embrace textualism and 
purposivism, precedent and history, as well as concern for constitutional values 
and pragmatic concern for consequences.  Multi-valence interpretation does not 
incorporate conƤdence in the existence of single right answer, and may in some 
cases view a range of answers as constitutionality tolerable or plausible.
Constitutional Interpretation Methodology
An important divide among interpretive approaches across national courts 
is between those who argue that constitutional meaning is Ƥxed at a particular 
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moment in the past, known as originalism, and those who believe constitutional 
meaning is legitimately subject to evolving understanding, known as non-
originalism_. With an originalist approach, to enforce the Constitution is to 
enforce it as originally understood by the framers._ Thus, for originalism the 
interpretation of a constitutional provision comprises two interpretive moments, 
the moment at which the original meaning / understanding of the provision is 
ascertained and a second moment when when that meaning becomes signiƤcant 
to the case being presided over._
Originalists look to the intent of the framers proposes and treat the 
Constitution as if it were the product of a single author. However, often texts are 
in fact the result of quarrelsome collaboration and endless series of compromises 
among the many framers.1 Goldsworthy introduces the deƤnition of originalism 
as ‘the thesis that the content of a constitution is determined partly by the 
intentions or purpose of its founders, of the understandings of the founding 
generation’.2 
For non-originalists, the constitutional text is meaningful but it is not 
singular. The one meaning of the constitutional text, to the originalist, is the 
original meaning. To a non-originalist, the original meaning is not the only 
meaning of the constitutional text.3 Some provisions of the constitutional text 
have a meaning in addition to the original meaning, where those provisions 
reƪect fundamental aspirations of the framer. There is more complexity than 
just the original meaning.4 A non-originalist judge is interested in the original 
meaning of the Constitution but to them, this is only one meaning of the text.
ustiƤcation o Constitutional Interpretation Methodology
In reviewing judicial review cases of the Indonesian Constitutional Court 
from 2003 to 2008, I have used Ƥve types of constitutional interpretation. The 
reason for choosing each of these approaches is elaborated in the following 
discussion on each method. 
1 Ball, above n ǨƤǤ, 138.
2 Goldsworthy, above n 40,  322.
3 Perry, above n 52, 246.
4 Ibid 247.
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Textual Interpretation 
According to this approach, a judge has to decide what the meaning of the 
constitutional provision is for current existing circumstances. Sotiros adds that 
a textualist deƤnes what the Constitution means by consulting the plain words 
of the constitutional document.5
In understanding the constitution through textual interpretation, judges 
should decide for themselves what these provisions mean for the case they have 
to review.6
Original Intent Interpretation 
Original intent is almost the same as purposive interpretation. This is 
a methodology deƤned by trying to Ƥnd out what was the intention of the 
constitutional framers when they drafted the constitution text. Bork emphasizes 
that intentionalism would be mandatory for judges even if the framers had not 
intended intentionalism for judges.7 Scalia, as a great supporter for original 
meaning approach, argues that indeed judges should be limited to determining 
what the constitutional text meant when it was adopted.8
Pragmatic Interpretation 
Pragmatic interpretation is an approach whereby the Justice looks to the 
eơect of the applicability of the Constitution provision. Another name for this 
approach is consensualist. After a Justice considers a number of potential eơects, 
the Justice will decide one eơect that is suited to current conditions, and decide 
that as the meaning of that constitutional provision. Scholars who use the 
term “pragmatism” in discussions of constitutional matters agree that it is an 
“umbrella term” covering diơerent views about law. It is also considered legal 
instrumentalism, a condition where law is instituted to serve social purposes 
and should be interpreted in that way.9 One understanding of this general idea 
5 Sotirios A. Barber and James E. Fleming, Constitutional Interpretation : The Basic Question (Oxford Universtiy Press, Inc. , 2007) 67.
6 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Taking Rights Seriously ‘ (1977)  Harvard Universty Press136.
7 Barber and Fleming, above n  81.
8 Jackson, above n 61, 602.
9 Richard A Posner, ‘hat as the Pragmatism to Oơer awǯ (1990) (63) Southern Law California Law Review1656.
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is that the Constitution is what it says it is, an instrument of ends like justice, 
the general welfare, and national security, and should be interpreted to facilitate 
these ends.10
Proportionality Interpretation 
The proportionality approach has little to do with how a judge reads 
constitutional provisions. Instead it is applied when justifying limits on democratic 
rights and fundamental rights. Kommers claimed proportionality interpretation 
is at the heart of the judicial process on basic rights in Germany, Canada, South 
Africa and India.11 Robert Alexy defends the proportionality approach as an 
essential tool for constitutional interpretation.12
Structural Interpretation 
In the narrow sense, structural interpretation focuses not on the meaning of 
speciƤc, isolated clauses, but rather on the location of the clause and its relation 
to the whole text. In a broader sense, it seeks unity and coherence not only in 
the text, but in the larger political order that the text signiƤes.13  An example 
of structural interpretation is deƤned by the German Constitutional Court. In 
Southwest State (1951), the German Constitutional Court drew a line for the critical 
importance of the Constitution’s unity, stating, “no single constitutional provision 
may be taken out if its context and interpreted by itself. “Every constitutional 
provision,” it continued, “must always be interpreted in such a way as to render 
it compatible with the fundamental principles of the Constitution as a whole. 14
Cases on Constitutional Interpretation Methodology
Original Intent Interpretation
Electricity Case15
The Petitioners were made up of the Association of Indonesian Counselors 
of Law and Human Rights and some individuals. The petitioners claimed that 
10 Barber and Fleming, above n 59, 171.
11 Kommers, above n 41, 202
12 Jackson, above n 61, 604.
13 Kommers, above n 41,199. 
14  1 BVerfGE 14,32 (1951)
15  Case Number 001-021/PUU-I/2003.
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Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution had been violated by a Law on Electricity 
that granted privatization to electrical power plants, which they asserted, as one 
of the most essential production branches dominating many people’s interests, 
should be controlled by the State.  The process of privatization meant that, as a 
result of unbundling a system that leads to the pricing being determined by fair 
and normal competition, the public as consumers of electricity had to pay for 
electricity at higher prices. Article 33 (2) of 1945 Constitution states: “Essential 
services which are important for the state and which aơect the livelihood of the 
public shall be controlled by the state.”
The Court argued that the interpretation of “controlled by the state” must 
cover the broad meaning of state domination, which originated from the concept 
of Indonesian sovereignty over all sources of wealth and water, all domestic 
natural prosperity. 
The Court referred to founding father’s intention in drafting Article 33 in 
1945, as stated by Mohammad Hatta. The Court stated that,
“the interpretation of control by the state is that the state has to strengthen the 
essential services that it owns so that gradually it will be able to independently 
provide for the needs which concern the livelihood of many people and 
replace the positions of the national and foreign private companies.”16
However, the Court further argued if electricity as the essential service is still 
considered important to the state and/or to dominate many people’s interests, 
the Government must still dominate this essential service by ruling, caring for, 
managing, and supervising it to be utilized to the greatest people’s welfare as 
an objective of the Preamble of 1945 Constitution. 
Capital Punishment is Constitutional17
The Petitioner consisted of Indonesian and foreign individuals. The Petitioners 
were convicted and sentenced to death under the Narcotics Law. The Petitioners 
argued that capital punishment is contrary to and in violation of the 1945 
Constitution. The Petitioners argued that capital punishment under the Narcotics 
16  Case Number 001-002/PUU-I/2003, 348.
17  Case Number 002-3/PUU-V/2007.
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Law violated Article 28A and Article 28I (1) of the 1945 Constitution. Article 28A 
stated that: “Every person shall have the right to live and to defend his/her life 
and living”. The Petitioners claimed that the phrase, which cannot be reduced 
under any circumstances whatsoever, clearly prohibits capital punishment.
However, according to the framers of human right articles in the 1945 
Constitution, those articles should not be read the way Petitioners claimed. 
Lukman Hakim Saifuddin and Patrialis Akbar, members of an ad hoc committee 
responsible for drafting the human rights articles in the 1945 Constitution, 
stated that it was not the intention of the framers that human rights could be 
enforced absolute.18 The spirit is to regulate the protection of human rights, 
but this has limitations, as long as the limitations are conducted by way of law. 
Therefore, the chapter of human rights articles in the 1945 Constitution ended 
in the adoption of Article 28J (2), which states:
“in exercising his/her rights and freedom, every person shall have the duty to 
accept the restrictions established by law for the sole purposes of guaranteeing 
the recognition and respect of the rights and freedoms of others and of 
satisfying just demands based upon considerations of morality, religious 
values, security and public order in a democratic society.”
By referring to the framers’ intention, the Court declared that capital 
punishment under the Narcotics Law is constitutionally valid. 
Textual Interpretation
Bali Bombing Case19
In this case the Court decided that human rights are limited as long as 
the limitation is conducted through law by referring to the framers’ intention, 
and further in the Bali Bombing Case, the Court adopted a strict approach to 
what the 1945 Constitution said, speciƤcally, “right shall not be prosecuted with 
retroactive clause”.
The Petitioner Masykur Abdul Kadir, had been convicted under the Eradication 
of the Criminal Acts of Terrorism Law Number 16 Year 2003 (Terrorism Law) 
18  Case Number 002-003/PUU-V/2007. 
19  Case Number 013/PUU-I/2003.
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with respect to his participation in the Bali Bombing. As background, the Bali 
Bombing happened on 12 October 2002. On 18 October 2002, the Government 
issued Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1 Year 2002 on Eradication of 
the Criminal Acts of Terrorism. At the same time, the Government also issued 
Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 2 Year 2002 on Eradication of the 
Criminal Acts of Terrorism for the Bali Bombing Incident on 12 October 2002. 
The latter, Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 2 Year 2002 was adopted 
by the DPR into Law Number 16 Year 2003.20
The Petitioner considered his rights to have been impaired by Law Number 
16 Year 2003, namely the rights regulated under Article 28I (1) of the 1945 
Constitution which reads: “….. the right to be recognized as a person before the 
law, and the right not to be prosecuted under retroactive law shall constitute a 
human right which cannot be reduced under any circumstances whatsoever”. 
The Petitioner claimed that in fact, a retroactive law had been applied to the 
petitioner. 
In deciding this case, the Court was of the opinion that basically, law must be 
applicable prospectively. The application of the retroactivity principle in criminal 
law has an exception, namely that it may only be applied on gross violation of 
human rights as an extraordinary crime. Terrorism is not categorized as a gross 
violation of human rights as intended in the 1998 Rome Statute.21 The Court 
further opined that:
“Though the legislator has the authority to create law, but the prosecution 
against every form of committed crime should be implemented through 
just and certain law enforcement, not by new law making through the 
formulation of new laws.”  
The Court declared Law Number 16 Year 2003 as constitutionally invalid 
because it contradicts Article 28I(1) of the 1945 Constitution.
20  Article 22 of the 1945 Constitution allows the President to enact this type of law in compelling circumstances as an interim 
regulatory measure. A Peraturan Pemerintah PenggantiUndang-Undang / Perppu (Government Regulation in ieu of aw) lapses 
unless the DPR conƤrms it in its Ƥrst sitting following the issuance of the law.
21  Case Number 013/PUU-I/2003, 44.
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Proision on ͜͞τ or Education Budget
The constitutional provision on the Education Budget is a classic example 
of the application of textual interpretation. In this case, the Petitioners were 
teachers and the Indonesian Teachers Association. The Petitioner argued that 
the provision of section 31 (4) of the Indonesia, which states, “The state shall 
prioritise the budget for education to a minimum of 20% of the State Budget 
and of the egional Budgets to fulƤl the needs of implementation of national 
education,” is imperative..
From 2005, the Petitioners annually Ƥled a judicial review case against the 
State Revenues and Expenditure Budget Law. In 2005, Education 1st Budget case 
22, the Court dismissed the petitioner’s petition.  In 2006 and 2007, Education 
2nd Budget case23 and Education 3rd Budget Case24, even though the Court granted 
the petition, considering the legal eơects caused if that State Revenue and 
Expenditure Budget Law was declared constitutionally invalid, the Court only 
declared the existing percentage of the education budget in 2006 State Revenues 
and Expenditure Budget as violating the Constitution.
In 2008, Education 4th Budget Case, 25the educational budget in the Revised 
2008 State Revenues and Expenditures Budget Law was only 15.6%. Considering 
those three previous decisions, the Court held that:
“There are suƥcient reasons for the Court to assess that there is intention of 
the regulator to violate the 1945 Constitution. As a consequence, the Court 
declared the entire Revised 2008 State Revenues and Expenditures Budget 
Law as constitutionally invalid”26
The Court rejected the Government’s argument that the Government had 
to allocate budget for energy subsidies and to pay foreign debt on the groudns 
that if the budget for energy subsidies and foreign debt is set aside from the 
State budget, the educational budget would be at the 20% required by the 
Constitution.27  Despite the rise of oil prices and Indonesia’s obligation to pay 
22  Case Number 012/PUU-III/2005, Judicial review of aw Number 36 ear 2004 regarding the 2005 State Revenue and Expenditure Budget.
23  Case Number 026/PUU-III/2006, Judicial review of aw Number 13 ear 2005 regarding the 2006 State Revenues and Expenditures Budget.
24  Case Number 0026/PUU-IV/2006, Judicial review of aw Number 18 ear 2006 regarding the 2007 State Revenues and Expenditures 
Budget.
25  Case Number 013/PUU-VI/2008.
26  Case Number 013/PUU-VI/2008, 100.
27  Case Number 013/PUU-VI/2008, 101.
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national foreign debt and economy security to handle turbulence in the economy 
crisis resulting from the global Ƥnancial crisis in 2008, the Court was Ƥrm with 
Government and Parliament to allocate education 20% of State Budget and 
Expenditure Budget as required by article 31(4) of 1945 Constitution. 
Education reuirement or Indonesian Migrant orers28
The Petitioner was an organization working for the interests of Indonesian 
migrant workers overseas. The Petitioner argued that article 35 (d) on Placement 
and Protection of Indonesian Workers Abroad Law contradicts the 1945 
Constitution. Article 35(d) read as follows: 
“Recruitment of Indonesian worker candidates by private organizers must 
be conducted for candidates having complied with the requirements of... d) 
having at least graduated from Junior High School or equivalent.”
The Petitioner claimed that article 35(d) violated the Petitioner’s right as 
provided by Article 28D (2) of 1945 Constitution, which provides that “every 
person shall have the right to work and to receive fair and proper recompense 
and treatment in employment.”
The Court argued that an adult requires a job to be able to fulƤll the necessities 
of life both for himself and his family without discriminating whether that person 
is a graduate of Junior High School or not. If he/she cannot gain employment, 
the Court further argued it can be assured that such a person will not be able 
to provide for himself of his family, and therefore his right to survival will be 
compromised, moreover his right to a prosperous life. 
In this case, the Court explained that the requirement to access for a job as 
stated by Article 28D (2) shall not be limited by introduction of a law. If that 
person cannot get a job because the qualiƤcation required is not suitable to his/
her circumstance, that person may apply for another job, however, the law shall 
not prohibit people from getting access to a job because of his/her educational 
background. In this case, the Court focused on the implementation of access to 
occupancy as required by Article 28D (2) of 1945 Constitution. 
28  Case Number 019-020/PUU-III/2005.
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Pragmatic Interpretation
Supervision on Advocate Case29
This case was related to the conƪict between two diơerent laws on the 
supervisory authority over private legal practitioners. The Petitioners were 
individual lawyers who tried to challenge the constitutionality of article 36 (and 
its elucidation) of Law No. 5 Year 2004 that Amended Law No. 14 Year 1985 on 
Supreme Court, which provides that, “the Supreme Court and Government shall 
supervise private legal practitioners and notaries.”30
The Petitioner argued that Law No. 5 Year 2004 was in conƪict with Law No. 
18 Year 2003 on Advocates, which provides that it is the Bar Association that has 
the authority to supervise private legal practitioners. The Petitioner then tried 
to argue that the Supreme Court Law provision regulating the supervision of 
legal practitioners should be declared unconstitutional because it is in conƪict 
with the Advocate Law. 
The Ƥrst issue that the Court dealt with was whether or not the Court in 
fact had authority to review conƪicts between two diơerent statutes. The Court 
decided that it should intervene because the conƪict between the Advocate 
Law and the Supreme Court Law would generate legal uncertainty. Moreover, 
the Court believed that it should intervene because the lawmakers could not 
exercise their authority in the proper way. Thus, the Court held:
The Court did not Ƥnd any violation of constitutional rights as the Petitioner 
has claimed… however, it is obvious that the legislature did not exercise its 
authority with prudence and it has produced inconsistency between one 
statute and another. This inconsistency might have ended up with legal 
uncertainty, that can potentially violate the constitutional provision of article 
28D(1) which states that, Every person shall have the right to the recognition, 
the guarantee, the protection and the legal certainty of just laws as well as 
equal treatment before the law..31
29  Case Number 067/PUU-II/2004.
30  The elucidation of article 36 states that, “in general, the supervision and stewardship upon private legal practitioner and notary is 
responsibility of government. With regards to their tasks that relate to judiciary, private legal practitioner and notary are under the 
supervision of the Supreme Court. In supervising, the Supreme Court and government should respect and guard the independence 
of private legal practitioner and notary in the performance of their tasks. Whenever disciplinary action should be necessarily taken 
against private practitioner and notary such as dismissal and removal, including temporary suspension, respective professional 
organization should be heard in advance.”
31  Case Number 067/PUU-II/2004, 31. 
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Furthermore, the Court held that:
Regardless of the Petitioner’s inability to prove his claim, the Court has 
concluded that the error in the law-making process (inconsistency between 
two statutes) has created legal uncertainty. therefore article 36 of the Supreme 
Court law is inconsistent with article 28D (1) of the 1945 Constitution (equal 
protection clause) and the Petitioner’s petition should be granted.32
Through a unanimous decision, the Court struck down article 36 of the 
Supreme Court Law and expanded its jurisdiction by asserting that the Court 
can resolve inconsistencies between two diơerent statutes. Even though the 
constitutional injury had not arisen, the inconsistency between the Supreme 
Court Law and the Advocate Law led to uncertainty for the Petitioner.  
I categorized this case as a pragmatic approach because the Court clearly 
stated that there is no constitutional injury concerning the enactment of Supreme 
Court Law. However, due to the application of two overlapping laws that conƪicted 
in their regulation of the same thing, the result was legal uncertainty for the 
Petitioners. 
The Judicial Commission Case 33
This case is an example where the Court rejected the originalist interpretation 
and opted instead for a textual interpretation. The Petitioners were 31 Supreme 
Court Justices who asked the Constitutional Court to annul the authority of Komisi 
Yudisial (Judicial Commission) to investigate them. The Judicial Commission was 
a newly established institution with authority to nominate Supreme Court Justices 
and to uphold the dignity of judges34, under which authority the Commission 
may recommend sanctions against poorly performing judges to the Supreme 
Court or Constitutional Court.35 Not long after its establishment, the Judicial 
Commission was engaged in a conƪict with the Supreme Court. The conƪict 
escalated when the Commission later made public the names of 13 justices it 
32  Case Number 067/PUU-II/2004, 32-33. 
33  Case Number 005/PUU-IV/2006.
34  Judicial Commission aw art 13. 
35  Judicial Commission aw art 21.
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called “problematic” and the Commission decided to summon those 13 Supreme 
Court Justices.36
In their petition for constitutional review, the Petitioners argued that article 
24B(1) 1945 Constitution only gives authority to the Judicial Commission to 
supervise judges. Article 24B(1) states:
“there shall be an independent Judicial Commission which shall posses the 
authority to propose candidates for Supreme Court Justices and shall posses 
authority to maintain the honor, dignity and behavior of judges.”
According to the Petitioners, the scope of the Commission’s authority was 
only to overview lower court judges and not those of the Supreme Court and 
the Constitutional Court. Moreover, the Petitioners argued that Commission was 
essentially a partner to the Supreme Court in supervising lower court judges.
The Court held that the supervisory role of the Judicial Commission could 
not be constructed in the context of the separation of powers because the Judicial 
Commission was simply a supporting organ of the Supreme Court.37 The Judicial 
Commission held no judicial power. Second, the Court ruled that the supervisory 
role of the Judicial Commission was vague, on which the Court held,
The Commission’s authority according to article 24B(1) of the Constitution 
is under the scope of implementation of the code of ethics and code of 
conduct of judges. Therefore, in the Ƥrst place there should be a norm that 
governs the meaning and scope of judge’s behavior... that includes who has 
authority to make codes of ethic. The Judicial Commission Law does not 
cover those issues at all. It has created much uncertainty because the law 
assigns a supervisory role, but the judge’s behavior that becomes the subject 
of supervision became unclear.38
The Court further held that:
Lack of clarity and detail of statutory rules of the supervisory authority and 
judge’s behavior has created the unintended consequences that the Judicial 
Commission and the Supreme Court came out with their own interpretations, 
which ended with legal uncertainty. Therefore, the lawmakers should clarify 
the Judicial Commission supervisory rule in more detail.39
36 The Jakarta Post, Commission to Grill 13 Justices, 20 February 2006.
37  Case Number 005/PUU-IV/2006, 182. 
38  Case Number 005/PUU-IV/2006, 187.
39  Case Number 005/PUU-IV/2006, 193.
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Finally, the Court concluded that all provisions in the Judicial Commission 
Law that relate to its supervisory role should be declared inconsistent with 
the Constitution and void on the grounds that they created legal uncertainty.40 
The Court refused to interpret this case using the original intent methodology 
because the framers that provided testimony in the Court came to opinions as 
to what was meant by “judges”.41 It is interesting to observe the opinion of Butt, 
who felt that, despite public criticism towards this decision, appreciation should 
be given to the Court. He stated that ‘the court emphasized the importance of 
judicial independence to a functioning state, legal system and judiciary.42
Structuralist Interpretation
Regional Election Commission is not responsible to DPRD.43
The Petitioners were private legal entities having concerns and interests 
in democratic and honest administration of General Elections for Regional 
Heads and Deputy Heads (Head of Regency Election) and Chairpersons of the 
Provincial General Election Commission. The Petitioners argued that article 
57 (1) and article 66(3) of Law Number 32 Year 2004 on Regional Government 
contradicts Article 22E of the 1945 Constitution. Article 57 (1) of Law Number 
32 Year 2004 on Regional Government Law states that the Regional General 
Election Commission “...is responsible to the Regional People’s Representative 
Council,” as well as Article 66 (3) that reads “…request for the accountability on 
the performance of the Provincial General Election Commission”.
In the Petitioner’s argument, the requirement for the Provincial General 
Election Commission to be responsible and report to the Provincial General 
Election was argued to breach the principle of an election being fair and 
independent as required by Article 22E of the 1945 Constitution, of Article 22E 
(5) which provides that, (5)  General elections shall be organized by national, 
permanent and independent commissions for general elections.
40  Case Number 005/PUU-IV/2006, 201. 
41  Case Number 005/PUU-IV/2006, 177.
42 Simon Butt, ‘The Constitutional Courtǯs Decision in the Dispute between the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission ǣ Banish-
ing Judicial Accountabilityǫǯ (2009) 09(31) Legal Studies Research Paper.
43  Case Number 072-073/PUU-II/2004.
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The Government in its reply stated that a local election is not under the 
regime of governed elections. Head of Regency elections are governed by Article 
18(4) of 1945 Constitution, which provides: (4) Governors, Regents and Mayors 
as the respective heads of provincial, regency, and municipal governments shall 
be elected democratically.
The Court was of the view that arranging a direct election for the head of 
the region must be based on general election principles, i.e., direct, public, free, 
conƤdential, fair and carried out by an independent organizer as required by 
Article 22E of the 1945 Constitution. Such objectives could not be achieved if 
the Regional General Election Commission as the organizer of the election for 
the head of the region was accountable to the DPRD, which consists of political 
parties who compete in such direct elections. The Regional General Election 
Commission must be accountable to the public instead of to the DPRD.44 The 
Court declared article 57 (1) and article 66(3) of Law Number 32 Year 2004 on 
Regional Government Law as constitutionally invalid. In this case, the Court 
settled the confusion between the meaning of “general election” as stated in 
Article 22E and its relation to Article 18(4) of the 1945 Constitution. The Court 
was also able to decide that principles applicable to elections should apply to 
all types of election. 
Proportionality Interpretation
Film Censorship45
The Petitioners argued that Ƥlm censorship violates the 1945 Constitution. 
The Petitioners included an actress, a Ƥlm maker, a Ƥlm producer, a Ƥlm festival 
organizer and a Ƥlm lecturer. The Petitioners’ argument was that the existence of 
censorship and a censorship institution violates Article 28C(1) of the Constitution.
Even though Article 28C(1) the 1945 Constitution provided the right to 
enjoyment of art and culture and Ƥlm is one product of art, however, the Court 
determined that preemptive steps must be taken to restrict certain types of art 
44  Case Number 072-073/PUU-II/2004, 114.
45  Case Number 029/PUU-V/2007.
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before they are made available in the public domain.46 A Ƥlm that is not Ƥrst 
censored may do damage that cannot be undone. To further these goals, an 
institution should be created to evaluate Ƥlms and prevent Ƥlms from circulating 
that may harm or injure another person’s human rights. Nevertheless, the Court 
suggested that the implementation of Ƥlm censorship must be in compliance with 
current standards not the original rationale under which the law was drafted. 
The Court decided that the Law on Film Censorship was constitutional. 
In this case, the Court acknowledged that the enjoyment of art is protected 
by the Constitution. The Court also acknowledge that art should be enjoyed in 
“a complete” way without any ‘scratch’ that may reduce the quality of the art. 
However, the Court tried to put in the perspective that censorship is still needed 
in order that the public not suơer because of the art.  The Court pointed out 
that enjoyment of art should be put in balance with the protection of society. 
Film Censorship is required to protect the public from imbalances or unnecessary 
values. 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission is unconstitutional.47
The Petitioners were individuals who had been victims of forceful 
disappearances by the military in 1998 and groups of people who had a common 
interest in human rights. The Petitioners argued that article 27 of Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Law is constitutionally invalid. Article 27 of Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission Law has made the victims right to compensation 
and rehabilitation dependent on the granting of amnesty. Amnesty as required 
by article 27 requires the existence of the perpetrator. Consequently, without the 
existence of the perpetrator, it is impossible to grant amnesty, thus the victims 
do not obtain the guarantee for rehabilitation.48
The Court recalled that the Government has an obligation to the fulƤllment 
of human rights as ordered by Article 28I(4) of the 1945 Constitution:(4) The 
protection, promotion, enforcement and fulƤllment of human rights shall be 
the responsibility of the state, particularly the Government. 
46  Case Number 029/PUU-V/2007, 227.
47  Case Number 006/PUU-IV/2006.
48  Case Number 006/PUU-IV/2006, 21.
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The Court accepted the Government’s argument that one of the objectives of 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission was to provide compensation for victims. 
However, the applicability of article 27 was ƪawed in its emphasis on individual 
perpetrators’ criminal responsibility as it is diƥcult to identify the individual 
perpetrators, victims, and witnesses of human rights violations. This situation 
led to article 27 of Truth and Reconciliation Commission Law to contradict with 
Article 28D of 1945 Constitution which provides, (1) Every person shall have the 
right to the recognition, the guarantee, the protection and the legal certainty of 
just laws as well as equal treatment before the law.
Due the fact that article 27 is the spirit of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission Law, the Court declared the whole law as constitutionally invalid. 
In this case, the Court considered the right for victims to get compensation for 
past violations and the diƥculty to obtain such compensation. 
hy the Court Moves Further than Framer Intention
The Ƥrst generation of the Justices of the Constitutional Court ended their 
term on 18 August 2008. In their era as the Ƥrst generation of Indonesian 
Constitutional Justices, the Constitutional Court rendered important decisions 
and was recognized as the most respectful judiciary in Indonesia. The Court 
received 169 judicial review cases, 274 general election result dispute case for 
2004 general election result disputes, one Presidential and Vice President Election 
Result dispute, and 10 cases on disputes between State institutions. At the time 
of the writing of this paper, the Constitutional Court has never received a case 
on the impeachment of the President or the Vice President.49 The Court also 
struck out two laws, as wholly constitutionally invalid and revised numerous 
other laws.  What is the reason for that action? Are there any speciƤc forces that 
drove the Constitutional Court to act so progressively? In order to answer that 
question, I propose three possible possibilities.  First is lack of constitutional 
law support, second, the nature of the 1945 Constitution, and third, the role of 
Chief Justice Jimly Asshiddiqie.  
49 Mahfud MD, ‘The Role of the Constitutional Court in the Development of Democracy in Indonesia ‘ (Paper presented at the World 
Conference on Constitutional Justice Cape Town 2009).
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ac o Constitutional aw Support
For many years, the New Order military regime, under President Suharto 
that ruled Indonesia for more than 30 years, relied on political repression to 
maintain the regime’s authoritarian ideology. The use of intimidation also 
applied to academic institutions. Any voice of opposition from a scholar would 
automatically be suppressed by the regime.50 In such circumstances, scholars 
who seriously studied constitutional law would be subjected to political pressure 
whenever they produced critical writing on government structures and practices. 
Consequently, the study of constitutional law is not well developed because there 
were not many scholars willing to risk challenging the authoritarian government 
through critical writing.51
Moreover, there was a lack of interest in the study of constitutional law, 
caused by great skepticism from Indonesia law students over the job prospects 
of being a constitutional lawyer in Indonesia.52 Indeed, without a constitutional 
court as a forum for constitutional lawyers to appear, the jobs for constitutional 
lawyers were severely limited.  As a result, most Indonesian law students tended 
to focus on private law instead of public law, which includes constitutional law. 
Existing constitutional theories aơect how justices will decide certain 
kinds of controversial cases.53 In Indonesia’s experience, constitutional court 
practice probably often dominates constitutional law theory. Judges may often 
move to theories that support what they want, i.e. to theories that support the 
interpretive style they want to engage in. The existence of constitutional theories 
is justiƤcation for particular constitutional interpretations that are brought into 
question.54 In making their arguments, Justices may be inƪuenced by their own 
ideology, biases and references.55 Constitutional law consists of methodological 
principles, doctrines and interpretation of speciƤc provisions either in the bare 
text of the constitution or what is reliably known of its founders’ intentions and 
50 Ariel Heryanto, State Terorism and Political Identity in Indonesia: Fatally Belonging (Routledge, 2006).
51 Jimly Asshidiqqie, Pokok-Pokok Hukum Tata Negara Indonesia Pasca Reformasi (the Principle of Indonesian Constitutional Law in 
Post Reformation) (Bhuana Ilmu Populer, 2007) 38.
52 Ibid.
53 Mark V Tushnet, ‘Does Constitutional Theory Matterǫǣ A Commentǯ (1986 - 1987) 65(4) Texas Law Review 777 778.
54 Perry, above n 1 257.
55 Robert A Dahl, How Democratic is the American Constitution? (2001) 55.
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purposes.56 Interpreting the Constitution calls for a combination of constitutional 
law and moral philosophy from the Justices.57 The existing constitutional law 
is needed to maintain a connection between constitutional adjudication in the 
constitutional court with the society in which it functions.58
Consequently, even though I have argued this in gross simplicity, this condition 
leads constitutional Justices to decide constitutional cases on the strength of their 
personal political preferences, not their answers to such philosophic questions as 
the nature of the Constitution and the best approach to Ƥnding constitutional 
meaning.59  This condition will lead the Court to move to Ƥnd rationalization 
in “judicial philosophies”, “constitutional principles” and after-the-fact window 
dressing for decisions reached on personal political grounds.60
On the other hand, the lack of previous practice of judicial review and 
the lack of constitutional law development in Indonesia created a “freedom 
environment” for the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court could 
adopt other constitutional court practices in deciding their cases. The Court 
used practices from the South Korean Constitutional Court and German 
Constitutional Court, such as the principle of erga omnes / ultra petita,61 and 
conditional constitutionality.62
The Nature o The 1945 Constitution
Another argument that I would like to present to support the assertion is 
the nature of the 1945 Constitution and its defects. As mentioned earlier, the 
amendment to the constitution was conducted in four phases, and the framers 
decided from the beginning that the amendments were to be conducted in 
this way. Once an area had been settled, the framers did not revisit the related 
articles.63 As Indrayana resumed, the amendment process was conducted through 
“accident not design.”64
56 Goldsworthy, above n 40,  321.
57 Dworkin, above n  60, 189.
58 Jackson, above n 61, 606.
59 Barber and Fleming, above n  43, 8.
60 Ibid.
61  Case Number 001-021.PUU-I/2003, Electricity Case.
62  Case Number 058-059-060-063/PUU-II/2004 and 008/PUU-III/2005, the Management of Water Resources. 
63 Indrayana, above n 335.
64 Ibid 332.
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The framers were also hesitant to grant ‘full’ human rights protection in 
Article 28 of 1945 Constitution. However, the framers ‘locked’ the implementation 
of human rights with Article 28J as follows, 
(1) Every person shall be obligated to respect the human rights of another 
person in the orderly life of community, nation and State;
(2) In exercising his/her rights and freedoms, every person must submit to 
the restrictions stipulated in laws and regulations with the sole purpose to 
guarantee recognition of and  respect for other people’s rights and freedoms 
and fulƤll fair demand in accordance with the considerations of morality, 
religious values, security, and public order in a democratic society.
Chie Justice Jimly Asshiddiie
I believe the strongest driving force in the Court’s approach was the role 
of Chief Justice Jimly Asshiddiqie in orchestrating and managing his brethren. 
When the Constitutional Court oƥcially opened on 19 August 2003, it had no 
funding, no oƥce and no support staơ. Chief Justice Jimly frequently stated 
that he started the Court with only three pieces of paper: the Constitution, 
the Constitutional Court Law and the Presidential Decree that appointed the 
Constitutional Court Justice.65 With no oƥce and no infrastructure, the Court 
had to use the Chief Justice’s personal mobile phone as its Ƥrst contact number.66 
Chief Justice Jimly, as he was commonly referred to, was the only constitutional 
law scholar from a prominent university among the initial Justices and the only 
Justice with a strong constitutional law background. 
As someone who closely followed the constitutional reform process, Chief 
Justice Jimly was aware that the Government tried in several ways to limit 
the authority of the newly-established Constitutional Court. Moreover, as a 
constitutional scholar, Chief Justice Jimly also understood that the purpose 
of a constitutional court is to evaluate legislation and if the Court remains 
compliant to the government, the whole existence of Constitutional Court will 
be meaningless.67
65 Jimly Asshidiqqie, ‘Bermodal Tiga Lembar Kertas (With Three Pieces of Paper)ǯ, Republika 11 January 2004
66  Chief Justice Jimlyǯs mobile phone is kept at Constitutional Court Museum. 
67 Hendrianto, above n 16, 106.
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Therefore, Chief Justice Jimly immediately moved to declare that the 
Constitutional Court had the authority to invalidate statutes whenever they 
violate the Constitution. Chief Justice Jimly argued that the Court’s decision to 
invalidate a Law is part of the democratic process, in other terms protecting what 
he called the voice of the general populace.68 The Chief Justice explained that:
“A Law that is passed by Parliament and the Government is a reƪection 
of majority voice. However, majority voice may not equal the voice of the 
general (populace), because there is a constitution that reƪects the voice 
of the general (populace). So, whenever a Law does not comply with the 
Constitution it breaks the voice of the general (populace). Whenever a Law 
violates one constitutional right, it has violated the voice of the general 
(populace) and the Court should invalidate such statute.”69
Scholars of the early years of the Indonesian Constitutional Court conclude 
that the Court tried to position itself as the guardian of the Constitution by 
upholding the principle of the rule of law (negara hukum).70 It was Chief Justice 
Jimly who fought for the recognition of judicial status for the Constitutional, 
Court and it was also he who devised the strategy to raise the proƤle of the 
Court in its early years of operation.71
From the beginning, Chief Justice Jimly believed that the Court should win 
the hearts of constitutional stakeholders and that the Court should become an 
alternative forum for the public to defend their rights.72 Chief Justice Jimly was 
fully aware that the Court would not be able to exercise its authority if nobody 
appeared before it. Therefore, Chief Justice Jimly tried to employ a generous 
strategy.73 One example of this is his generous treatment of standing. In the 
Electricity Case,74 the Petitioners were pubic interest advocacy groups. The Court 
held that Every citizen as a taxpayer had the constitutional right to question 
every law closely connected with economic policy having implications for their 
welfare.75
68 Personal communication with Chief Justice Jimly, 18 August 2004.
69 Hendrianto, above n 16, 106.
70 Butt, above n ; Petra Stockmann, The New Indonesian Constitutional Court: A Study into its Beginnings and First Years of Work (Hans 
Seidel Foundation, 2007)
71 Hendrianto dissertation explained further the role of Chief Justice JimlyAsshiddiqie in driving Indonesia Constitutional Court (2003-2008). 
72  Personal communication with Chief Justice, 18 August 2004. 
73 JimlyAsshiddiqie, interview by Hendrianto, 31 July 2006.
74  Case Number 001-021-022/PUU-I/2003.
75  Ibid. 
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His constitutional law training made Chief Justice Jimly realize the importance 
of judicial institutions. Chief Justice Jimly was fully aware that the whole point 
of establishing a constitutional court was to scrutinize legislation, but if the 
government circumscribed the Court’s authority, then there would be no point 
in establishing a Constitutional Court. Therefore, Jimly believe that the Court 
should invalidate a Law whenever it violated the Constitution.76
III. CONCLUSION
There is no exact constitutional interpretation in my view. Each citizen may 
view the constitution according to his or her beliefs, understandings, values and 
expectations as to what the constitution means. Constitutional scholars, judges 
and Justices also have their own views and opinions as to which approaches to 
constitutional interpretation best reƪect the true meaning of a constitution. 
In exercising their authority, a Constitutional Court Justice sees constitutional 
interpretation as a tool to Ƥnd the truth or the best understanding of the 
Constitution as an instrument to claim justice and to protect the general welfare, 
and the other goods listed in the constitution. 
Why does constitutional interpretation methodology matter? If a court 
decision cannot be expressed in terms of the nature of what the Constitution 
prescribes and what its words mean, then it is hard to see how society and 
scholars discern the authority of a judicial decision. It is undeniable that the 
Constitutional Court’s presence in the Indonesian constitutional system has 
contributed greatly to the development of democracy and the enforcement of 
law in Indonesia. Since the Constitutional Court was established, legislative 
institutions are no longer able to formulate laws based on political strength 
alone, because despite having been produced democratically, the entire law or 
part of its substance can be annulled by the Court if its making or substance 
is contradictory to the Constitution. The discussion and date presented above 
shows how the Indonesian Constitutional Court has played an important role in 
76  Personal communication with Chief Justice Jimly, 18 August 2004.
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the development of democracy in Indonesia. Similarly, after the Constitutional 
Court was established, the President can no longer be threatened by impeachment 
merely because of a political decision he or she makes.
Through its methodology, the Court has placed itself as the guardian if the 
constitution and the protector of human rights. Although the Court does not 
have a political mandate, all the actions of the Court and its decisions must be 
in line with political realities. This is not because it is the Court’s preference 
to do so but because the Court’s decisions will impact upon the political 
machinations. There is acceptance in Indonesia that the Court has a role in 
policing the democratic systems. 
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